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Attorney Liability for Malicious
Prosecution and Legal Malpractice:
Do They Overlap?
At the February, 1976, meeting of the California Medical Association,
that organization's House of Delegates adopted a resolution whereby physi-
cians may get monetary support from the Association to enable them to take
legal action against attorneys whom the physicians believe have wrongfully
brought malpractice suits against them.' In Illinois, the State Medical
Society has announced the establishment of a fund to pay the legal costs of
doctors who wish to fight malpractice suits or take legal action against
malpractice plaintiffs and their attorneys alleging the initial actions were
frivolous.2 Malicious prosecution, the tort that forms the basis for the
majority of the doctors' suits against attorneys, is not a new cause of action.
3
Malicious prosecution suits aimed at attorneys as well as at the opposing
litigants are not unique4 and might have passed almost unnoticed were it not
for the present medical malpractice controversy that has focused national
attention on this particular type of case.5 In California, a growing number of
malicious prosecution cases have appeared in recent months,6 indicating the
possibility of an all-out counterattack by medical malpractice defendants.
The concern caused by this development is aggravated by the fact that it
comes at a time when attorneys are experiencing a malpractice crisis of their
own. 7 One question that arises is whether or not the success of malicious
prosecution plaintiffs will force attorneys to be so cautious in naming
defendants that they will inadequately represent their clients and thus be-
come vulnerable to suits for legal malpractice.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the relationship of malicious
prosecution and legal malpractice. To this end it is necessary to define the
1. Blubaugh, Doctors Retaliate By Suing Lawyers Who Sued Them, Sacramento Bee,
April 25, 1976, §B, at 3, col. 1.
2. Hacker, Some Doctors Turn The Tables on Patients, Lawyers, The National Ob-
server, Feb. 21, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
3. W. PROSSER, LAW OFTORTS §119, at 834 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
4. See, e.g., Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589,63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967), overruled
on other grounds, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 850, 479 P.2d 379, 384, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 184 (1971); Anderson
v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131 P. 697 (1913). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1132 (1969).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See note 1 supra.
7. Henry Nussbaum, a senior program editor for Continental National Insurance Co.,
has noted that claims against attorneys "have just about doubled" in four years. N.Y. Times,
June 18, 1975, §1, at 44, col. 1.
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scope of both malicious prosecution and legal malpractice. Specifically, this
will involve a discussion of the attorney's duty to refrain from injuring
innocent third parties (malicious prosecution) and the attorney's duty to his
client to maximize the client's chance of recovery by naming proper defend-
ants (legal malpractice). From this discussion it will be possible to deter-
mine whether the two actions overlap and whether attorneys will be able to
conduct litigation with any degree of assurance that they will not become
liable for either malicious prosecution or legal malpractice.
THE SCOPE OF THE TORTS
A. Malicious Prosecution
vialicious prosecution, as the name implies, originally applied only to
criminal prosecutions.8 Modernly it applies equally to civil litigation. 9 The
elements of malicious prosecution are generally agreed to be: (1) a proceed-
ing instigated by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the
prior proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for
the prior proceeding; and (4) malice or improper purpose. 1 To understand
how this tort is used by medical malpractice defendants in subsequent
actions against plaintiffs' attorneys, it is necessary to examine each of the
elements as they may be applied in evaluating attorney conduct.
1. Instigation
The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must show that the defend-
ant instigated the prior action."1 An action is regarded as having been
"instigated" when the proceeding has been treated by the court as a proper
one, 12 that is, where the case has proceeded to the point that it involves
official action.' 3 Under certain circumstances, the plaintiff's attorney may
be considered the instigator of the previous lawsuit. Attorneys have been
held to be the instigator in cases where they have assisted in prosecuting
cases knowing that there was no sufficient basis for the action. 14 In addi-
tion, a comment to Section 674 of the Restatement of Torts states that
8. PROSSER, supra note 3, §120, at 850.
9. Id. at 853. "The majority of the American courts. . . permit an action to be founded
on any ordinary civil suit .... In the minority of jurisdictions where malicious prosecution
may not be founded on a civil suit, the potential malpractice/malicious prosecution dilemma
discussed in this comment would, of course, not exist.Id.
10. PROSSER, supra note 3, §120, at 853-56.
11. Id.
12. See Shaul v. Brown, 28 Iowa 37 (1869); Mask v. Rawls, 57 Miss. 270 (1879).
13. See Halberstadt v. New York L. Ins. Co., 194 N.Y. 1, 86 N.E. 801 (1909); Mitchell v.
Donanski, 28 R.I. 94, 65 A. 611 (1906). It is not entirely clear whether the mere filing of a
complaint would constitute instigation. Under Halberstadt, it would constitute instigation, but
under Mitchell it would not. Under either, however, once service of process has been achieved,
instigation is established.
14. E.g., Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967), overruled on
other grounds, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 850, 479 P.2d 379, 384, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 184 (1971); Hoosac
Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424 (1884); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn.
224, 28 N.W. 2d 780 (1947); Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131 P. 697 (1913).
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"[t]he person who initiates civil proceedings, is the person who sets the
machinery in motion whether he acts in his own name, or that of a third
person . . ." Thus it seems clear that an attorney who files a complaint
with knowledge that it has no merit will not be able to exculpate himself by
pointing to the fact that he was acting as an agent for the plaintiff."5
Therefore, in a malicious prosecution action against an attorney, it is
possible to establish the first element of the cause of action by showing that
the attorney was the instigator of a prior action wrongfully commenced.
2. Termination
To prevail in a malicious prosecution action the plaintiff must also show
that the prior action, in which he was a defendant, was terminated in his
favor.16 In the context of a civil case involving the naming of a doubtful
defendant, the rules for determining whether or not the proceeding has
terminated in favor of that defendant seem clear and easy to apply. Obvious-
ly a defense verdict'7 or a dismissal on the merits'" will constitute favorable
termination. In addition, a malicious prosecution plaintiff may establish
favorable termination by showing that the previous action was abandoned by
the person bringing it. On the other hand, a plaintiff's verdict in the previous
action raises a complete bar to a malicious prosecution action.'
9
The effect of an out-of-court settlement is also clear. The rule is that
termination of the action by way of compromise will bar an action for
malicious prosecution.2' This is true notwithstanding the fact that it is
clearly regarded as wrongful to bring an action without probable cause
for the purpose of causing the defendant to pay a sum of money to
avoid the financial or other burdens which a defense would put
upon him [or] when the proceedings are based upon alleged facts
so discreditable as to induce the defendant to pay a sum of money
in order to avoid the notoriety of a public trial. 21
Thus, while the plaintiff is wrong in using these pressures to induce settle-
ment, the defendant, if he succumbs to them, loses his cause of action for
malicious prosecution.
22
15. RESTATEMENTS OF TORTS §674, comment a at 440-41 (1938).
16. PROSSER, supra note 3, §119, at 835.
17. See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941); Hurgren v. Union
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 141 Cal. 585, 587, 75 P. 168, 168 (1904).
18. See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941).
19. Rouse v. Twin Pines Sanitarium, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 2d 639, 643, 328 P.2d 536, 538
(1958). This is true even if the verdict is overturned on appeal. Della Jacova v. Widgett, 355
Mass. 266, 268, 244 N.E. 2d 580, 582 (1969). It seems therefore, that if an attorney believes he
can prevail at the trial level he need not fear a malicious prosecution action even if he is relying
on a statute he feels certain cannot pass constitutional muster. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §662(b),
comment 1 (1938).
20. Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312, 314 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965 (1950);
D'Alessandro v. Pickford, 22 Cal. App. 2d 239, 241, 70 P.2d 646, 647 (1937).
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §676, comment b at 452 (1938).
22. Contra, Smith v. Markensohn, 29 R.I. 55,69 A. 311 (1908). A payment by the plaintiff
so that he could avoid criminal prosecution and leave the state was found to be duress and as
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While favorable termination is an essential element of the tort of mali-
cious prosecution, its rules are clear in cases against attorneys involving the
naming of doubtful defendants. Thus, it is unlikely that this matter will be in
dispute. Usually the termination element will be established easily or not at
all. The principal matter in contention is likely to be whether or not the
attorney had probable cause to name the doubtful defendant in the prior
action..
3. Probable Cause
The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action has the burden of showing
that the prior action against him was initiated without probable cause. 23 A
plaintiff in a civil action has probable cause to bring the suit if he reasonably
believes he has a good chance of convincing the court or jury that he ought
to prevail. 24 This criterion, however, may be more rigid than the cases
require. Probable cause in criminal cases does not demand a belief on the
part of the prosecutor that he can obtain a conviction, but only a belief that
the accused is guilty of the crime. 25 By analogy, it would seem that a civil
litigant need not believe that he has a chance of winning, much less a good
chance, but only that he has been wronged and ought to prevail on the facts
even though the law and precedent are against him.26 Even under the view
requiring belief on the part of the plaintiff that he has a good chance of
winning, it is clear that probable cause does not mean that the plaintiff will
probably prevail.27 Probable cause in a civil case has been defined by one
court to be "a belief in the cause of action or facts alleged, based on
sufficient circumstances to reasonably induce such belief .... ",28 Many
such could not constitute a bar to a malicious prosecution action. This result, however, is
contrary to the weight of authority as discussed at length in Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312,
314 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965 (1950). On the other hand, it does not appear that
settlement by an insurance company against the will of the insured would constitute a bar even
if the insurance contract allows the company such discretion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §33 (1957). This section imposes a duty on the agent to obey the will of the principal
even if the principal, in imposing his will, violates the contract between himself and the agent.
No case was discovered in which the defendant argued that the plaintiff should be barred by an
insurance company settlement. It would seem that this rule of agency would preclude such bar
being raised by a defendant who knew the insurance company was settling against the will of
the plaintiff.
23. Garfield v. People's Fin. & Thrift Co. of Riverside, 24 Cal. App. 2d 144, 145,74 P.2d
1061, 1063 (1937).
24. Smith v. Smith, 296 Ky. 785, 788, 178 S.W.2d 613, 614 (1944).
25. Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 364, 105 P. 537, 539 (1909).
26. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §675(b), comment f (1938).
To hold that the person initiating civil proceedings should be liable, unless the claim
prove valid, would throw an undesirable burden upon those who by advancing claims
not heretofore recognized nevertheless aid in making the law consistent with chang-
ing conditions and changing opinions. Id. at 449.
27. See Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr,
291 (1975). Even in criminal prosecutions, the burden of showing lack of probable cause has
been historically the most difficult part of proving a case of malicious prosecution. Professor
Prosser stated that it is "hedged with restrictions that make it difficult to maintain." PROSSER,
supra note 3, §119, at 841.
28. Linsay v. Evans, 174 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Mo. App. 1943).
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other courts have defined the term in substantially similar language, 29
making it apparent that the issue comes down to a determination of whether
or not the plaintiff acted reasonably in the first action.
The reasonableness of any conduct is, of course, subject to varying
interpretations. It appears that there is no liability for malicious prosecution
if the prior action was founded upon misinformation, 30 so long as the
original information was derived from sources a reasonable person would
regard as trustworthy.3 1 The instigator is not required to exhaust all sources
of information, 32 but is required to make such inquiry as the case renders
reasonable and proper.33 As long as appearances would lead a reasonable
person to believe that the case has merit, it is unlikely that an inquiry would
be required. 34 These standards apply to the party bringing the action. 35 If the
attorney has knowledge of all the facts known to his client, he would, of
course, be culpable to the same degree as his client. However, it appears an
attorney may rely on information given to him by his client so long as that
information is at least plausible. One court has stated that:
It would be inimical to the administration of justice if an attorney
were held liable for malicious prosecution action, where after
honest, industrious search of the authorities, upon facts stated to
him by his client, he advises the latter that he has a good cause of
action .... 36
Another court qualifies this apparent blanket authorization to regard a
client's allegations as true by imposing the requirement that the attorney
have a reasonable belief that the claim is tenable. 37 Apparently, it is
sometimes unreasonable to believe the facts as stated by a client. However,
a lawyer is not required to believe that a client's cause is just;38 therefore, if
29. See, e.g., Lantay v. McLean, 2 Ariz. App. 22, 406 P.2d 224 (1965) (reasonable ground
to warrant ordinarily prudent man in believing accused is guilty); Malvern Brick & Tile Co. v.
Hill, 232 Ark. 1000, 342 S.W.2d 305 (1961) (state of facts as would induce a man of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe the accused was guilty).
30. Whitney v. New York Cas. Ins. Ass'n, 27 App. Div. 320, 325, 50 N.Y.S. 227, 230
(1898).
31. Spechtv. Eastwood Nealley Corp., 34N.J. Super. 156,169, 11 A.2d 781,787 (1955).
32. Center v. Dollar Mkts., 99 Cal. App. 2d 534, 542-43, 222 P.2d 136, 141-43 (1950).
33. Lawrence v. Leathers, 31 Ind. App. 414, 420, 68 N.E. 179, 181 (1903); Lacy v.
Mitchell, 23 Ind. 67, 68 (1864).
34. See Lawrence v. Leathers, 31 Ind. App. 414, 420, 68 N.E. 179, 181 (1903).
35. PROSSER, supra note 3, §120, at 854.
36. Murdock v. Gerth, 65 Cal. App. 2d 170, 179, 150 P.2d 489, 493 (1944) (emphasis
added).
37. Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975).
So long as an attorney does not [prosecute a claim] which a reasonable lawyer would
not regard as tenable. . . by unreasonably neglecting to investigate the facts and law
in making his determination to proceed [malicious prosecution will not lie]. Id.
(emphasis added).
An attorney may "without being guilty of malicious prosecution, vigorously pursue litigation in
which he is unsure of whether his client. . . is truthful, so long as that issue is genuinely in
doubt. "Id. at 684, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98 (emphasis added).
38. Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535, 538 (1852). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6068 provides in
pertinent part: "It is the duty of an attorney to maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses
only as appear to him legal or just .... " (emphasis added).
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a malicious, spiteful plaintiff wishes to pursue a weak but tenable claim, an
attorney may represent him without becoming liable for malicious prosecu-
tion.3
9
When an attorney brings an action where the liability of the defendant is
questionable, he is faced with the likelihood that the defendant will achieve
a favorable termination through a dismissal or a defense verdict. Should this
occur, a malicious prosecution plaintiff may still have considerable difficul-
ty showing that the action was brought without probable cause. However,
there is one circumstance in which defense verdicts are likely and lack of
probable cause for bringing the action will be apparent. Specifically, when a
defendant to an action is named for the tactical purpose of coercing his
testimony against other defendants, liability for malicious prosecution will
depend upon whether this tactic constitutes an improper purpose. This will
be discussed below!
n0
Defense verdicts and dismissals, in some respects, pose fewer risks for an
attorney than abandonment of the action altogether. This is because the
former establishes only the element of favorable termination and leaves the
malicious prosecution plaintiff with the burden of showing that the prior
action was brought without probable cause. However, once an action has
been abandoned, or a defendant has been dropped and the matter has gone to
judgment without him, not only will the element of favorable termination be
established, but the abandonment also gives rise to a strong inference that
the action was brought without probable cause.41 California case law fol-
lows the Restatement of Torts view on the inference to be drawn from
abandonment of an action.42 The Restatement makes it clear that abandon-
ment establishes the element of favorable termination and is evidence of
lack of probable cause. 43 A Restatement comment goes further, stating that
the inference in a civil action has the effect of imposing a duty on the
defendant to introduce rebuttal evidence. Therefore, this would seem to
raise the inference to the status of a presumption. 44
The seriousness of the problem facing an attorney wishing to abandon an
action will depend upon the availability of evidence to rebut the inference of
lack of probable cause resulting from the abandonment. Another Restate-
ment comment states that:
[t]he private prosecutor. . . can make this fact (the withdrawal)
immaterial [as evidence of lack of probable cause] by showing his
39. Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 150, 3 S.W. 577, 580 (1887).
40. See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §674(b), comment g (1938). In order to reach the conclusion
that abandonment gives rise to an inference of lack of probable cause, it is necessary to follow a
path from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §674 to §660 to §665.
42. See Williams v. California Milk Producers Ass'n, 136 Cal. App. 172,28 P.2d 59 (1934)
(complaint dismissed because of private prosecutor's failure to press prosecution; held evi-
dence of lack of probable cause).
43. See note 41 supra.
44. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §665(1), comment a (1938).
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reasons for doing so were such that from them no inference of a
lack of probable cause can properly be drawn. Thus, he can show
that the charge was withdrawn because of after discovered excul-
patory facts [after commencing the action] or because the infor-
mation on which the charge was based was found to be unreliable
45
It seems clear that the attorney is not relieved of the responsibility of
insuring that the initial complaint is filed with probable cause. The proviso
that the exculpatory facts be discovered after the action has been initiated
'indicates that an attorney who decides, upon later reflection on the same
facts that caused him to initiate the suit, that he does not have a case will not
be excused from having acted without probable cause. Furthermore, while
the attorney might escape liability on the ground that his client has wilfully
or negligently provided him with unreliable information, this defense may
not be effective unless he has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the truth
and thereafter promptly released the defendant from the suit.
46
In light of the above discussion, it appears that an attorney is permitted to
bring only those actions that a reasonable lawyer would regard as tenable
and to name only those defendants he reasonably believes may be liable. 47 A
standard of reasonableness does not seem likely to place an undue burden on
an attorney. Even if the attorney abandons an action under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of want of probable cause, he should have little
problem rebutting the inference if he has conducted himself reasonably in
naming the defendant initially. On the other hand, if the attorney does not
conduct himself reasonably and want of probable cause is established, he
may find the situation particularly troublesome because, as discussed in the
next section, malice may be inferred from want of probable cause.
4. Malice or Improper Purpose
The final element that the malicious prosecution plaintiff must show is
that the plaintiff in the first action initiated the action maliciously or with an
improper purpose. 48 This element, in theory, makes malicious prosecution
an intentional, rather than a negligence cause of action.49 Actual ill will
constitutes malice;50 however, actual ill will on the part of an attorney will
seldom be present. More frequently, malice will be found when the purpose
for initiating the action is something other than adjudication of the claim on
45. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
46. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 30-39 supra.
48. Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 682, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 296 (1975): PROSSER, supra note 3, §119, at 847.
49. See Johnson v. Ebberts, 11 F. 129, 131 (C.C.D. Ore. 1880): "The malice necessary [in
malicious prosecution] is the wilful doing of an unlawful act .... "; Palermo v. Cottom, 515
S.W.2d 758, 765 (Mo. App. 1975): "Malice ...is the intentional doing of a wrongful act
50. Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Ky. 1952).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
which the action is based. 51 Malice has been found when the attorney has
acted in reckless disregard for the defendant's rights52 and where the action
was brought to bluff the plaintiff.53
Regardless of the theory on which a court relies to find malice, a close
factual analysis of the cases suggests that malice is almost always found
from the same facts as those which establish lack of probable cause.54 Many
cases include statements to the effect that malice may be inferred from lack
of probable cause, 55 with some courts going so far as to say malice will be
presumed under these circumstances. 56 Section 669 of the Restatement of
Torts states that
[l]ack of probable cause for the initiation of civil proceedings, in
so far as it tends to show that the accuser did not believe in the
guilt of the accused is evidence that he did not institute the
proceedings, for a proper purpose.
57
California case law is replete with cases in accord with this statement.
58
Even though lack of probable cause and malice seem to arise from the
same facts, most courts continue to specify that malice is an essential and
separate element of malicious prosecution. 59 However, in discussing the
tort, courts mention malice but dwell on probable cause and use language
normally applicable to negligence causes of action. 60 There is frequent
51. See Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 338, 326 P.2d 918, 928
(1958).
52. E.g., Blunk v. Atchison T. & S.F. R.R. Co., 38 F. 311 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1889); Holden
v. Merritt, 92 Iowa 707, 61 N.W. 390 (1894).
53. E.g., Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr, 340 (1967), overruled on
other grounds, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 850, 497 P.2d 379, 384, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 184 (1971).
54. See, e.g., Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323,326 P.2d 918 (1958);
Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 36 N.W. 664 (1888).
55. E.g., Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 326 P.2d 918 (1958):
"Whether malice existed was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. . . .The jury could
have inferred malice from the want of probable cause." See also cases collected at Annot., 10
A.L.R.2d 1199 (1949).
56. Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 601, 36 N.W. 664, 669 (1888). Contra, Johnson v.
Huhner, 76 N.D. 13, 27, 33 N.W.2d 268, 275 (1948). Even in the minority of jurisdictions
ostensibly requiring actual malice, it is not entirely clear whether or not malice may be inferred.
In Foster v. McClain, 251 So. 2d 179 (La. 1974), the court in a libel action against attorneys
which under Louisiana law is similar to malicious prosecution and in which actual malice must
be shown, found no actual malice. Interestingly, in commenting on this matter, the court did not
say that there was no evidence that the attorneys knew their allegations were false but that
"[n]othing in the record indicates .. . the attorneys had reason to doubt . .. statements
.... The record fails to indicate that the attorneys could have known that the allegations were
untrue. . ." Id. at 181-82 (emphasis added).
57. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §669 (1938).
58. E.g., Fry v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 150, 298 P.2d 34
(1956); Centers v. Dollar Mkts., 99 Cal. App. 2d 534, 222 P.2d 136 (1950).
59. See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710,720, 527 P.2d 865, 871, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 241, 247 (1974); Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1975).
60. See Palermo v. Cottom, 525 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. App. 1975); Engelgau v. Walter, 181 Or.
481, 182 P.2d 987 (1947). Palermo is particularly illustrative of the general confusion between
intent and negligence in malicious prosecution. The court states that malice is an element of
malicious prosecution and that all elements "must be strictly construed." 525 S.W.2d at 763.
Later the court states that "probable cause is reasonable cause, not necessarily actual cause.
We must consider the facts as the prosecuting attorney could have reasonably believed them to
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reference to the reasonable person, the cautious person, and the prudent
person, 61 all of which seem inappropriate to a discussion of an intentional
tort. In the California case of Norton v. Hines,62 the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that attorneys owe a duty of reasonable care to defend-
ants in advising a client to commence a lawsuit against that defendant. 63 The
court specifically distinguished malicious prosecution from simple negli-
gence, saying that the latter "requires a different- and less demanding
standard of proof." 64 But then the court went on to say that "a cause of
action for malicious prosecution exists if the attorney prosecutes a claim
which a reasonable lawyer would not regard as tenable . . .by un-
reasonably neglecting to investigate the facts and the law.''65 Thus, in
Norton the court denied that attorneys owe a duty of care to defendants and
affirmed that attorneys must exercise reasonable care in deciding whether or
not to prosecute a claim. If there is any difference between the duty that the
court denies and the duty implicit in the requirement that the attorney
conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts and law, that difference is not
readily apparent. One commentator, referring to Norton, has argued that the
tort of malicious prosecution should be modified to allow a negligence
action by imposing upon attorneys a duty to investigate a client's allegations
before filing suit.66 However, such a modification would appear to consti-
tute judicial recognition of the law as presently applied rather than any
change in the law. An attorney is already required to have probable cause
before bringing an action, and probable cause does not exist if he has
unreasonably failed to investigate. 67 Furthermore, once want of probable
cause has been established, a finding of malice almost inevitably follows.
68
Other courts have had no less difficulty separating the elements of lack of
probable cause and malice. Malice is sometimes defined in terms of knowl-
edge that the claim is false 69 but this definition cannot be reconciled with a
be under the circumstances at the time." Id. at 764. Finally, the court states that "malice...
may be inferred from the absence of probable cause." Id. at 765.
61. E.g., Pollock v. Vilter Mfg. Corp., 23 Wis.2d 29, 41, 126 N.W.2d 602, 609 (1964)
(reasonable layman); Freides v. Sanimode Mfg. Co., 33 III.2d 291, 295, 211 N.E.2d 286, 288
(1965) (caution and prudence); Kincaid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 259 Cal. App. 2d 733,743,66
Cal. Rptr. 915, 920 (1968) (man of ordinary care and prudence).
62. 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
63. Id. at 923, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 924, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (emphasis added).
66. Comment, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack On Spurious Medical Malprac-
tice Claims?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 653 (1976). The author goes on to suggest that malice
should be defined as reckless disregard to make malicious prosecution easier to prove. Id. at
685. However, it seems that even less than recklessness, i.e. ordinary negligence, is presently
all that is required to support a finding of malice.
67. See text accompanying notes 23-47 supra.
68. In fact, a review of the cases revealed no case in any jurisdiction in which the
defendant was found to have acted without probable cause and without malice. In every case
reviewed in which the malicious prosecution action resulted in a defense verdict because the
defendant did not act with malice, it was also found that he had acted with probable cause.
69. Kennedy v. Byrum, 201 Cal. App. 2d 474, 482, 20 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (1962); Rupp v.
Summerfield, 161 Cal. App. 2d 657, 666, 326 P.2d 912, 917 (1958).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
definition of malicious prosecution that includes the element of lack of
probable cause. 70 If the plaintiff must show actual knowledge that the claim
is false to establish malice, any discussion of probable cause is meaningless.
Thus, this definition of malice results in a complete merger with the element
of lack of probable cause. The difficulty in separating the two elements
arises because it is almost impossible to hypothesize a situation where there
is a proper purpose to bring an action without probable cause. For example,
consider medical malpractice cases where a defendant is named not because
he is reasonably believed to be liable, but to coerce his testimony against
other defendants whose liability is probable. Although there does not appear
to be a case in which the malicious prosecution defendant has argued that
this purpose is proper, such a defense would fail because any purpose for
bringing proceedings other than "securing the adjudication of the claim on
which they are based" 7' is improper. The claim against a defendant thought
to be liable is, of course, separate from the claim against a defendant whose
testimony is being coerced. Therefore, adjudication of the claim against the
defendant thought to be liable cannot be used to justify the action against a
coerced defendant.
There may be a useful distinction between the elements of probable cause
and malice in special circumstances. If an attorney has neither a belief in his
client's claim necessary to establish probable cause nor any actual knowl-
edge that it is false, it may be possible to argue lack of malice even though
probable cause is clearly not present. Such a situation could arise where,
because of the imminent running of the statute of limitations, the attorney
names a defendant he later discovers cannot possibly be liable. The purpose,
to prevent the possible loss of the cause of action, may be held proper. 72 In
most other circumstances, however, an attorney charged with malicious
prosecution will have difficulty defending the action once lack of probable
cause is shown.
The above discussion of malicious prosecution and its elements indicates
a general consistancy among courts in stating the law of malicious prosecu-
tion and a corresponding consistency in applying different law to the factual
situations that have been presented. 73 Malicious prosecution is an action
disfavored in the law of most jurisdictions because it runs counter to the
public policy favoring recourse to the courts by citizens seeking justice.
74
Accordingly, a plaintiff wishing to bring an action for malicious prosecution
must satisfy a series of exacting requirements. He must prove the defendant
initiated the prior action against him without probable cause and that the
70. See text accompanying notes 23-38 supra.
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §676 (1938).
72. See text accompanying notes 117-122 infra.
73. See note 68 supra.
74. PROSSER, supra note 3, §119, at 841.
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prior action terminated in his favor. The final requirement is that the prior
action be brought with malice.75 This is consistent with courts' characteriza-
tion of malicious prosecution as an intentional tort. However, most courts
do not seem to require actual malice to support the action. The finder of fact
is sometimes allowed to presume malice and is frequently allowed to infer
malice from want of probable cause and, as a practical matter, almost surely
does one or the other whether or not either is specifically permitted.
Therefore, a standard of care to avoid injuring innocent defendants is
imposed upon attorneys in fact, if not in theory. That standard appears to be
one based on reasonableness. This is the same standard that is imposed upon
attorneys in discharging their duties to their clients, with the result that the
acts and omissions giving rise to malicious prosecution are strikingly similar
to those that give rise to an action for legal malpractice.
B. Legal Malpractice
An attorney has a duty to his client to exercise that "skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers or ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and
exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake. 7 6 He is re-
quired to conduct himself honestly and in good faith and to represent his
client's interests to the best of his ability.7 7 If he falls below this standard of
care he may be liable for professional negligence, more commonly referred
to as malpractice. The elements of legal malpractice as in other negligence
actions, are: (1) duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causal relation
between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damage.78
Legal malpractice has, of course, been found in a wide variety of circum-
stances; however, here we are concerned only with the question of whether
there are situations, actual or potential, in which an attorney may be liable
for malpractice in failing to name a defendant to an action when that
defendant's liability is questionable. This is the threshold question in deter-
mining whether or not the attorney will find himself trapped between the
conflicting interests of an inadequately represented client and the outraged
victim of a frivolous complaint.
The advantages to an attorney and his client in naming a large number of
defendants is such that, in the absence of any substantial countervailing
incentive not to do so, attorneys normally name as many as possible. First,
in many cases, the defendant who is primarily liable may be insolvent and a
75. Id. at 835.
76. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961),
quoted in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 180, 491 P.2d 421,
422, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 838 (1971).
77. Silver v. Shemanski, 89 Cal. App. 2d 520, 546,201 P.2d 418,435 (1949), quoted in Gay
v. Heller, 252 F.2d 313, 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1958): "If the issue which the attorney is called upon
to decide is fairly debatable, then . . . he is not only authorized but obligated to. . .urge his
client's claim."
78. Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604,611, 116 Cal. Rptr. 919,924(1974); Chavez
v. Carter, 256 Cal. App. 2d 577, 579, 64 Cal. Rptr. 350, 352 (1967).
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judgment against him would be worthless. Second, target or "deep pocket"
defendants are diligently sought not only to provide a greater source of funds
with which to satisfy a judgment but also to counterbalance jury sympathy
for a defendant upon whom an adverse judgment will visit great hardship.
Third, coercing testimony of one defendant against another, as mentioned
previously, 79 obviously makes it far easier for the attorney to prove his case.
Finally, naming everyone remotely involved insures that the statute of
limitations will not run against one whose liability is not promptly discov-
ered.
Since the success of the client's cause of action may turn upon whether or
not the attorney has secured one or more of the above named advantages
stemming from the naming of doubtful defendants, the question the attorney
must answer is whether or not in the particular case a failure to avail himself
of these advantages will be regarded as malpractice. In theory, it is clear that
the duty of an attorney to his client does not extend so far as to require him
to name a defendant under circumstances that would render the attorney
liable for malicious prosecution. 80 Such a rule would impose a duty to
commit a tort and would be without precedent in the law. However, while
there may not be a problem in theory, there may be one in fact since it is
often easier to state a legal principle than to apply it. For this reason, an
attorney faced with an uncertain choice of defendants will need some
practical guidance upon which he can base his decision to name or omit to
name a defendant.
The essence of an action alleging malpractice for failing to name a
defendant is a showing that the client could have won had the omitted
defendant been named. 81 In order to know whether he is omitting a defend-
ant against whom he could win a judgment, the attorney must know both the
law and the facts involved. If he fails to name a defendant he should have
named through ignorance of either, his liability for malpractice will be
determined by whether or not his ignorance resulted from a failure to
conform to the applicable standard of care. 82 Traditionally, that standard has
not required an attorney to have a perfect knowledge of the law; 83 even if he
has made a mistake that has been costly for his client, the courts have been
generous in not assessing liability if the mistake was one other attorneys of
ordinary skill might have made. 4 There is, however, some indication that
this tolerant attitude is waning.
79. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
80. See Gebhardt v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 220 S.W. 677, 9 A.L.R. 1076 (1920);
Weber v. Shay & Cogan, 56 Ohio St. 116, 46 N.E. 377 (1897).
81. Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (1960); Coggin,
Attorney Negligence: A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225 (1958).
82. See Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 612, 116 Cal. Rptr. 919, 924 (1974);
Chavez v. Carter, 256 Cal. App. 2d 577, 579, 64 Cal. Rptr. 350, 352 (1967).
83. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825
(1961).
84. Id.
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In the case of Smith v. Lewis,8 5 the California Supreme Court imposed
liability on an attorney for failing to know principles of law that could have
been ascertained by a well-informed attorney using standard research tech-
niques. 86 This case did not involve a doubtful defendant but it requires little
imagination to extend that decision and apply it to a case where an attorney
fails to name a defendant through ignorance of a law that would make that
defendant liable. The practice of naming everyone remotely connected with
the case would preclude this from happening; however, if the attorney is
dissuaded from naming doubtful defendants by the threat of a malicious
prosecution action, his vulnerability is increased. For example, if an attor-
ney fails to discover an intricate rule of agency, that failure could be the
basis of a malpractice action by a client. If the client might have prevailed
against either a solvent or an insolvent defendant on the same facts and the
solvent defendant is omitted, a legal malpractice action may very well
follow.
Whether the client will be successful in the malpractice action may
depend upon a court determination that the attorney has a duty to name
doubtful defendants in order to avoid the consequences of a mistake of law.
If Smith stands for the proposition that an attorney who unreasonably fails to
discover matters of law can be liable for malpractice, then it seems the client
is adequately protected against such a failure and does not need the addition-
al protection of a rule imposing a duty on the attorney to name doubtful
defendants. In fact, a rule that required the naming of doubtful defendants to
avoid damages flowing from the attorney's unreasonable failure to discover
matters of law would not impose any additional duty on the attorney, but
would give him license to protect himself from liability for his own negli-
gence by injuring innocent parties. Furthermore, if the mistake of law
causing the attorney to fail to name a defendant is one that would not be
regarded as malpractice under the Smith standard, that is, a non-negligent
mistake of law, it does not seem likely that the client could successfully
maintain that the attorney was negligent in failing to protect the client
against the attorney's non-negligent mistakes. An attorney, having done the
research required by the Smith standard and not discovering principles
giving him probable cause to name a defendant, should not be required or
even allowed to avoid the risk that he has missed some obscure point by
naming defendants who from all appearances are not liable.
87
85. 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), overruled on other grounds, 15
Cal.. 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976).
86. Id. at 358, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
87. But see O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 865 (1929).
The attorney misnamed a party, calling it a corporation rather than a co-partnership and as a
result lost the cause of action. In a malpractice suit, the court rejected the attorney's argument
that he had acted reasonably in considering the defendant's response to be a general appear-
ance. The point was apparently validly disputed because it was decided in favor of the attorney
at the trial level and reversed by a divided appellate court. Yet in the malpractice action the
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Mistakes of fact create a somewhat more difficult problem because they
may occur with or without fault on the part of an attorney. Like mistakes of
law, mistakes of fact may occur because the attorney unreasonably fails to
investigate, but mistakes of fact may also occur because inaccurate or
inadequate information is provided by the client. Also, mistakes of fact may
occur merely because information is not readily available. A professional
person is generally required to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the
facts upon which he bases his actions. 88 If the professional fails to exercise
reasonable care, there is no reason to treat this omission any differently than
a mistake of law. On the other hand, if the mistake is a result of inadequate
information provided by the client, the attorney may be liable if the un-
known fact is one about which he ought to have inquired in light of the
surrounding circumstances.8 9 It seems to follow that an attorney will not be
liable for malpractice if he has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the facts
and decides, based on these facts, not to name a doubtful defendant. If he
fails to make a reasonable effort to determine the facts, he should not be
allowed to avoid the consequences of his unreasonable conduct by putting
innocent parties to the trouble of defending groundless suits.
The attorney's most troublesome problem arises when he has insufficient
information to determine who should be named as a defendant but must
initiate immediate action to avoid being barred by the statute of limitations.
Suppose, for example, a client presents himself a few hours before the
statute will run and advises the attorney that he was injured under circum-
stances indicating that any one of 30 people may have been responsible. The
attorney, knowing that only one of the 30 people caused the harm, may
wonder if he must name them all to insure that the culpable party does not
escape liability. In California, it is permissible to name fictitious defend-
ants9° and later substitute the names of persons who are discovered to be the
actual tortfeasors. This procedure would no doubt be used to avoid this
dilemma. In jurisdictions where the naming of fictitious defendants is not
allowed, however, the problem is more difficult. It is clear that failure to
name everyone will create a grave risk of losing the cause of action. If the
culpable party is not named and the statute of limitations expires, the
question arises as to whether or not the client may prevail in a malpractice
action. If the client can show that naming a particular defendant would have
court said that "the point was doubtful [whether there had been a general appearance] and
could have been eliminated from the case by prompt action . . . . Skillful conduct requires
avoidance of wholly unnecessary risks." Id. at 780.
88. See Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968); Stevens v. United States, 294
F. Supp. 446 (D.S.C. 1968); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), overruled on
other grounds, 419 F.2d 337, 339 (1969). These cases all involve doctors rather than lawyers but
the principle appears equally applicable.
89. See Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), overruled on other grounds,
419 F.2d 337, 339 (1969). "Only if a patient is adequately examined, is there no liability for an
erroneous diagnosis." 368 F.2d at 630.
90. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §474.
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preserved the cause of action, and that later investigation could have estab-
lished that the unnamed defendant was the culpable party, the result of the
malpractice action will most likely turn upon whether the attorney acted
reasonably. This is a factual determination upon which two juries might give
different answers. Furthermore, it is certain that even if it is decided that an
attorney should name 30 people, at some point the naming of multiple
defendants merely because the group is known to include the tortfeasor
becomes unreasonable. For example, the mere fact that the population of a
city is known to include the tortfeasor does not justify naming everyone in
that city as a defendant. Also, it is apparent that if any very large group is
named, most of that group could successfully maintain that the action was
brought without probable cause. This is, therefore, one area in which the
same act could be argued to constitute malpractice or malicious prosecution
depending upon whether it is performed or omitted. 91
An attorney has a duty to his client to present the client's case vigorously
and in a manner as favorable to the client as the rules of law and professional
ethics permit.92 The duty requires only such conduct as is reasonable under
the circumstances. The attorney must make reasonable inquiry to determine
the state of the law and in ascertaining facts upon which a cause of action is
based. The attorney will not be liable for failing to name defendants if
reasonable inquiry does not reveal a basis for recovery against potential
defendants beyond the mere nuisance value of the action itself.93 Therefore,
the standard of conduct required of an attorney to avoid a charge of legal
malpractice is similar to that to which an attorney must adhere in deciding if
probable cause exists to name a defendant to an action, that is, the care of a
reasonable attorney under like circumstances. 94
THE RANGE OF ACCEPTABLE CONDUCT
As we have seen, the essence of an action for malicious prosecution is the
ability of the plaintiff to show that a prior action was brought against him
without probable cause. 95 The essence of an action for legal malpractice, as
it relates to naming possible defendants, is a showing by the plaintiff that he
could have recovered but for the failure of his attorney to name a particular
91. A less difficult question, because it appears to have been answered, is whether or not
failure to bring an action for its nuisance value can constitute malpractice. In the California case
of Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960), the court specifically
rejected the plaintiff's argument that her attorney was liable for negligently causing her to lose
the nuisance value of her cause of action even though she might not have been able to obtain a
judgment. The court said that "[o]ne who establishes malpractice on the part of his attorney
. . . must also prove that careful management of [the cause of action] would have resulted in
recovery of a favorable judgment .... " Id. at 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
92. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7, EC 7-1, Dr 7-101(A)(1)l.
93. Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960).
94. See text accompanying notes 17-34 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 61-74 supra.
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defendant. 96 If there are any factual situations that will satisfy the elements
of both torts, the two torts can be said to overlap. Both actions are beset with
difficulties for the plaintiff since in each, the plaintiff must allege facts that
are difficult to prove.97 Furthermore, in an action for malicious prosecution
the plaintiff runs afoul of policies "encouraging recourse to the courts by
honest citizens seeking justice."
98
The standards that apply in determining whether the malicious prosecu-
tion or malpractice plaintiff has sustained his burden of proof are remarkably
similar. An attorney who makes a mistake will not be liable for either tort so
long as he has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the state of the law and
determine the relevant facts of his case. 99 The standards applicable to both
torts allow for human fallibility and exercise of judgment. If the attorney has
an honest and reasonable belief in the propriety of the cause of action he
elects to pursue in behalf of his client, he will not be liable for an error of
judgment. 100 In theory, it appears attorney conduct which will cause liability
to attach for malicious prosecution on the one hand or for legal malpractice
on the other occurs at opposite ends of a spectrum of conduct that will be
regarded as reasonable. At one end of the spectrum it is unreasonable to
name a defendant and at the other it is unreasonable not to name a defend-
ant. If the principles discussed relative to each of the torts are valid, the
range of conduct that courts will regard as reasonable is wide. If a malicious
prosecution plaintiff can show that a prior action was brought against him
without probable cause, it seems that a malpractice plaintiff would find it
impossible to show he would have prevailed but for his attorney's negligent
failure to bring the action. Conversely, if a malpractice plaintiff can show
that he would have prevailed but for his attorney's failure to name a doubtful
defendant then, had the doubtful defendant been named, that defendant
would find it impossible to show want of probable cause in a malicious
prosecution action.
The empirical data suggest that what is true in theory is also true in
practice, at least with regard to malicious prosecution cases.101 A review of
96. Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (1960); Coggin,
Attorney Negligence: A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225 (1958).
97. See Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291 (1975). Even in criminal prosecutions the burden of showing lack of probable cause has
been historically the most difficult part of proving a case of malicious prosecution. Professor
Prosser stated that malicious prosecution is "hedged with restrictions that make it difficult to
maintain." PROSSER, supra note 3, § 119, at 841. Correspondingly, with regard to legal malprac-
tice the court in Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960), said that
"[o~ne who establishes malpractice on the part of his attorney . . . .must also prove that
careful management of [the cause of action] would have resulted in recovery of a favorable
judgment ...... Id. at 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
98. PROSSER, supra note 3, §120, at 851.
99. See text accompanying notes 30-39 and 82-89 supra.
100. In re Watts & Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903); Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v.
Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1975).
101. See, e.g., Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323,326 P.2d 918 (1958);
Palermo v. Cottom, 525 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. App. 1975); La Font v. Richardson, 119 S.W.2d 25
(Mo. App. 1938).
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the reported cases reveals no instances involving successful malicious pros-
ecution actions in which it appears that the client would have been success-
ful in a malpractice action had the attorney failed to name the defendant in
question.102 In most of the cases, the principal issue was whether or not the
defendant could show justification for having brought the prior action.
10 3
Since he was unable to show justification for bringing the action it seems
clear that his client would be unable to show he could have won. Thus, a
client would surely have floundered in any attempt to show he could have
recovered but for the attorney's negligent failure to bring the action. There-
fore, with the possible exception of cases brought with insufficient informa-
tion because of the imminent expiration of the statute of limitations, finding
the middle ground between the two torts will pose no problem for the
prudent attorney.
In order for an attorney confronted with a statute of limitations that is
about to expire to know whether or not he may name a doubtful defend-
ant, 10 it is useful to consider whether or not the exigent circumstances will
constitute a good defense in the event he is charged with either malpractice
or malicious prosecution. No case or comment appears directly to address
this matter with respect to either tort. Therefore, the state of the law must be
postulated by reference to analogous situations.
With regard to legal malpractice, an analogy may be made to other types
of negligence. Emergency circumstances have long been considered in
defining the standard of care to be imposed on the defendant in a negligence
action.l10 The theory that one faced with an emergency should be allowed
more latitude of action is usually applied in circumstances in which time to
reflect is not available. The doctrine contemplates a "sudden or unexpected
event which calls for immediate action." 106 The emergency doctrine pro-
vides that errors resulting when an actor must make a decision without time
to process relevant information, even though the information may be readily
available, may be excused. 107 The attorney faced with an impending statute
of limitations may have more time but inadequate information. Both actors
must take action before they are ready and in both cases the result is a
potentially erroneous decision brought about through excusable error. It
follows that the reasonableness of the attorney's action will be determined in
102. Since there are few, if any, successful malpractice actions against an attorney for
failing to name a defendant, it is not possible to approach this matter from the other direction,
i.e., whether an attorney successfully sued for malpractice could have been liable for malicious
prosecution. See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 22-47 supra.
104. This a problem that will arise only in jurisdictions that do not allow the fictitious
naming of defendants and in which filing the complaint constitutes initiation.
105. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Farmers Coop. Exch., 171 Kan. 501, 233 P.2d 468
(1951); PROSSER, supra note 3, §22, at 169.
106. PROSSER, supra note 3, §33, at 169.
107. Id. Professor Prosser also made the point that the standard is not really different as it
is still "the conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances." Id.
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light of the information he has available when he is forced to make his
decision. If this is so, no more should be required of the attorney than that
his conduct be reasonable in light of the circumstances. 1
08
With regard to malicious prosecution, the comment to Section 675 of the
Restatement of Torts states that less in the way of probable cause is required
to initiate a civil action as opposed to a criminal action because "[i]n many
cases civil proceedings, to be effective, must be begun before the relevant
facts can be ascertained to any degree of certainty." 109 That comment makes
specific distinction between criminal and civil actions as follows:
A private prosecutor does not have reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the accused has conducted himself in a particular manner,
if he merely entertains a suspicion even though he reasonably
believes it may be verified upon further investigation. On the other
hand, where proceedings are civil, it is enough that the person
initiating them believes that he can establish the existence of such
facts to the satisfaction of the court and jury. 110
Therefore, it follows that the imminent expiration of the statute of limita-
tions would constitute a defense to malicious prosecution as long as an
attorney has at least a suspicion that the named defendant may be liable and
some rational basis for that suspicion. If the above statement is correct, there
is no narrowing of the range of acceptable conduct between malicious
prosecution and legal malpractice when an attorney acts in the face of a
statute of limitations that is about to expire. On the contrary, he would be
allowed greater latitude and find even a wider range of acceptable conduct.
In view of the foregoing discussion, traditional standards of conduct
applied in both malpractice and malicious prosecution actions leave a broad
range of acceptable conduct between the two torts. All that has been
required to avoid liability for either tort is that the attorney conduct himself
reasonably." l1 Courts, in discussing whether or not specific conduct was
reasonable, have used substantially similar language relative to each tort and
allowed latitude for normal human error. Therefore, if traditional standards
apply, there is no overlap of liability between legal malpractice and mali-
cious prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The recent publicity surrounding the increase of malicious prosecution
actions filed by doctors against attorneys who have named them as defend-
ants in malpractice actions may have encouraged others who feel they have
been victimized by frivolous lawsuits to bring malicious prosecution ac-
tions. 11 This fact, considered in light of the growing number of malpractice
108. Id.
109. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §675, comment on clause (a), comment d at 448 (1938).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See text accompanying notes 30-39 and 82-89 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
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actions filed against lawyers appears on the surface to portend new problems
for practicing attorneys. A potential dilemma is created whereby naming a
defendant gives rise to a charge of malicious prosecution while failing to
name him gives rise to a charge of malpractice.1 13 However, this dilemma is
illusory. The standard of conduct required of an attorney to avoid either
charge is reasonableness. 114 In fact the two torts are so similar in most
respects that the only difference seems to be the identity of the injured party.
In theory, the similarity is not complete since malpractice is a form of
negligence 115 while malicious prosecution is an intentional tort116 requiring
either actual intent or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. In practice,
however, intent may be inferred not only from reckless disregard of the
plaintiff's rights but from mere failure to exercise reasonable care, 117 thus
making malicious prosecution indistinguishable from a negligent tort. Fur-
thermore, the standards of reasonableness that have been imposed by the
courts relative to legal malpractice and malicious prosecution seem to be
identical.
118
The range of acceptable conduct between the torts is wide. To sustain an
attack for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show that there was no
possibility he would have lost' 19 while the malpractice plaintiff must show
he surely would have won. 120 It is almost inconceivable that the facts
supporting one tort would also be found to support the other. Therefore,
even if the recent upsurge in malicious prosecution actions by doctors
against attorneys should continue unabated, it is unlikely that these actions
will drive attorneys to the brink of malpractice. On the contrary, the demise
of the practice of naming everyone remotely connected with a case will
probably lead to more thorough investigation resulting in better representa-
tion and thus reduce the incidence of legal malpractice. Finally, to the extent
that this development inhibits the disreputable practice of filing complaints
for their nuisance value, the overall effect may be beneficial. The filing of
frivolous suits depletes resources from which truly injured parties may
recover and has a destructive effect on the tort system that benefits no one.
For the competent attorney who conducts himself honestly and prudently,
the widely heralded counterattack will pose no significant problem.
Paul Greisen
113. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 30-39 and 82-89 supra.
115. Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611, 116 Cal. Rptr. 919, 924 (1974).
116. See Johnson v. Ebberts, I1 F. 129, 131 (C C.D. Ore. 1880).
117. See text accompanying notes 49-75 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra
119. Le., that the action has not only terminated in his favor but that the defendant did not
have probable cause to believe it could have ended in any other way.
120. Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (1960).
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